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A varietyof empiricaland theoreticalevidence publishedin recent years
suggests that frictions in credit markets are crucial to understand the mon-
etary transmission mechanism. The objective of this paper is to provide a
quantitative evaluation of the “credit view”-interpretation of this evidence.
Special attention is paid to the role of borrowers’ net worth. A model with
endogenous agency costs is developed where a debt contracting problem
with asymmetric information between lender and borrower is embedded in
a stochasticdynamic general equilibriummodel with money. The model in-
corporates a cash-in-advance constraint and a limited participationassump-
tion in order to induce a liquidity effect of monetary shocks and to propa-
gate monetary disturbances. The paper has two principal conclusions: First,
the model economy shows that a positive money supply shock generates an
increase inoutputandinemployment. Second, ex anteheterogeneityof bor-
rowers has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the reactions of the model economy to
a monetary shock.
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mission mechanism, credit channel, limited participation,liquidityeffect
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11 Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that an expansionary monetary policy shock gener-
ates a decrease in nominal interest rates and an increase in the level of employ-
mentand output- theso-called liquidityeffectof monetarypolicy.1 Inrecent years
many economists argued that frictions in credit markets are crucial to understand
how this monetary shock works, that is to understand the monetary transmission
mechanism.2
The most importantexample ofthis viewis the creditchannel of monetarypol-
icy, which consists of the Bank Lending Channel and the Balance Sheet Channel.3
Both emphasize the importance of asymmetric information in ﬁnancial markets.
According to the bank lending channel, borrowers do not have direct access to
the credit markets but depend on loans from banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries can
solve asymmetricinformationproblems in credit marketsmore easily. Expansion-
ary monetary policy, which increases bank reserves and bank deposits, increases
the quantity of bank loans available and therefore increases loans to ﬁnance in-
vestment spending which will in turn increase aggregate output and employment.
The balance-sheet channel emphasizes the role of the net worthof borrowers. Fol-
lowing the balance-sheet channel, the amount borrowed does not only depend on
the price of credit, that is the interest rate, but, due to problems of asymmetric in-
formation, also on borrowers net worth. A lower net worth means a higher risk of
adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore whenever the central bank actions
inﬂuence the net worth of ﬁrms, e.g. through the general price level, the price of
equity shares or the nominal interest rates, these actions will also inﬂuence the
ﬁrms’ ability to invest.
On the theoretical side, the simple monetized Real Business Cycle with no
other frictions than a cash-in-advance constraint cannot account for a rise of the
output after a monetary shock. In these models, a monetary expansion will always
lead to a reduction of real output and of employment. Recent papers by Fuerst
(1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b), and Christiano (1991), based on the
earlier work of Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), Lucas (1990),
show however, that a positive output response is possible in a monetary model
with a cash-in-advance constraint. This is done by incorporating the so called
1For recent empirical evidence in support of the existence of the liquidity effect of monetary
policy, see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christianoand Eichenbaum (1992a).
2So Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke et al. (1996), Mishkin (1996), and many others.
3For the credit channel, see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Morris and Sellon (1995),
Hubbard (1995), or Ramey (1993).
2”limitedparticipation”or”sluggish cash ﬂow” assumptioninto a magnetizedRBC
model. This assumption means that ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries adjust their
ﬁnancialpositions morefrequentlyor moreeasily than dohouseholds, who cannot
adjust their portfolio immediately after a monetary shock is realized. After a
monetaryexpansion and as the households cannot adjust their real balances within
the period, the borrowers have to absorb the new amount of money, which they
will be willing to do only at a lower interest rate. This decrease of the interest rate
spurs investment and output growth.
As some of these limited participation models can replicate the liquidity effect
of monetary policy it has been argued in the literature, that they are “stylized
representations” of the credit channel.4
Concerning this argument and therefore concerning the relevant models, there
are, however, two important points to criticize. First, the special role of banks
in these models is purely ad hoc. The assumption that borrowers can only bor-
row from banks is not further justiﬁed. Such an assumption should, however, be
based on ﬁrst principles as well as on explicitly modeled informational problems.
Second and even more important, the special role of borrowers’ net worth is not
examined. Eitherthere is no networthofborrowersatall, orit is set constant. This
stands in clear contrast to the balance-sheet channel which exactly emphasizes the
effect of a changing net worth on the monetary mechanism. Furthermore, at least
since the ”debt-deﬂation” explanation of the Great Depression by Fisher (1933),
many economist have viewed ﬁnancial factors, such as borrowers net worth, as
important elements of business-cycle ﬂuctuations in general. A seminal contri-
bution to this line of research was made by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who
developed a general equilibrium model in which agency costs arise endogenously.
Building on this work, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) have shown that to
model borrowers with endogenous net worth can improve the dynamics of a real
business cycle model considerably.
In this paper, I present a model which is not subject to either of these two
points of criticism. Concerning the ﬁrst problem, I follow the recent work of
Fuerst (1995), Fisher (1999), and Cooley and Nam (1998) and embed the costly
state veriﬁcation framework introduced by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hell-
wig (1985) into a monetary business cycle model with cash-in-advance constraint
and limited participation assumption. As in Diamond (1984), there is a clear role
for a ﬁnancial intermediary to intermediate between borrowers and households in
order to minimize the aggregate monitoring costs. Therefore the special role of
4So e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1999).
3banks is well founded. Concerning the second point, I allow for asset holding of
borrowers and that they can change their net worth endogenously. The size of the
required loans does not only change with the size of the project, but also with the
size of borrower’s net worth.
The model of this paper can be thought of as a full stylized representation
of the credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, as all the infor-
mational problems in the ﬁnancial markets are fully included and net worth can
change endogenously. Allowing endogenous net worth of long-lived borrowers
introduces the problem of heterogeneity. At any point in time, there will be a
non-trivial distribution of net worth heterogeneity across borrowers. However, by
following the aggregation technique of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and
assuming a linear investment and linear monitoring technology, only the ﬁrst mo-
ment of the distribution of borrowers’ net worth has an effect on the aggregate
economy. Keeping track of the mean is simple and amounts to adding an addi-
tional state variable to the dynamic program.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section develops
the optimal ﬁnancial contract between lender and borrower in a partial equilib-
rium setting. Then, Section 3 describes the economic environment and deﬁnes the
general equilibrium. In Section 4, I calibrate the model using long-run US data,
compute the equilibrium by the method of undetermined coefﬁcients and discuss
its quantitative effects by analyzing impulse response functions. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The ﬁnancial contracts
In this section we consider a ﬁnancial contracting problem in a partial equilibrium
setting. We are able to separate the consideration of this contract from the rest of
the general equilibrium model because, by assumption, the contract is one period
of length only: For tractability we assume that there is enough anonymity in ﬁ-
nancial markets that only one-period contracts between borrowers and lenders are
feasible.5 The contract is negotiated at the beginning of a period and resolved by
the end of the same period.
The credit market comprises two types of agents, potential borrowers and po-
tential lenders. Both types are assumed to be risk neutral. The potential borrowers
5A similar assumption is made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Bernanke et al.
(1999).
4are entrepreneurs who wish to undertake risky projects but lack the necessary re-
sources so they turn to the investors for external ﬁnance. Investors can obtain their
resources by paying the rate on interest on riskless securities. In a competitive
market each investor treats the rate of interest on riskless securities as a parameter
and assumes he can obtain whatever funds he needs at that rate. The gross interest
rate, henceforth denoted by
R
>
1, is therefore the ﬁxed opportunitycost of funds
for the investor. Here, it is taken parametrically and will be later endogenized in
Section 3. Because investors have unlimited access to funds at the riskless rate of
interest, we can assume without loss of generality that each entrepreneur obtains
funds from at most one lender. In what follows, therefore, we consider only a
single, representative lender-borrower pairing.
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic production technology in which
an input of
I units of the consumption good is transformed into
!
I units of the
capital good. The random variable
! is independent and identically distributed
across time and entrepreneurs, with cumulative probability distribution function
￿, continuous probability density function
￿, a nonnegative support, and a mean
of unity. On competitive markets, the consumption good can be bought for the
price
P and the produced output of the capital good can be sold for the price
Q.
For the purposes of this section, we will take both prices parametrically. These
variables will be endogenized later in the general equilibrium framework.
At the beginning of the period, the investment level
I is chosen. The en-
trepreneur possesses a real wealth of value
N, measured in same terms as
I,t o






) must be ﬁnanced by the lender. The
entrepreneur maximizes his expected income on the project.
The entrepreneur’s production decision is complicated by three factors: First,
borrower’s net worth
N is sufﬁciently small so the entrepreneur would like to re-
ceive some external ﬁnancing.6 Second, the entrepreneurmust choose his produc-
tion level
I before observing the idiosyncratic technology shock
!. Finally, other
agents must expend monitoring costs of
￿
Q
I to privately observe the outcome of
a project with input level
I.7
This informational framework is the static model of costly state veriﬁcation
due to Townsend (1979). The asymmetric information between borrower and
lender creates a moral hazard problem in external ﬁnancing because, absent mon-
6In this section we just assume that net worth is sufﬁciently small so that the asymmetric
information problem is really relevant. In Section 3, where the contractual problem is embedded
into an inﬁnite horizon framework, we guarantee that this conditionis really true for each period.
7Note that the capital productionas well as the monitoringtechnologyexhibit constant returns
to scale. This assumed linearity is the source of the aggregation result below.
5itoring, the borrower may wish to under-report the true value of the shock
! in
order to reduce his debt repayment. As Townsend showed, this framework allows
us to motivate why uncollateralized external ﬁnance may be more expensive than
internal ﬁnance without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the contract structure.
Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1987) showed that the optimal
contract for this type of environments is a standard debt contract.8 In the un-
derlying framework, this contract form implies the following behavior: An en-

















) if he is solvent, and defaults otherwise. Here
R
l is the
interest rate on loans. The entrepreneurwill be insolvent if and only if his revenue













or equivalently, if the realization of the idiosyncratic shock


















). The lender will monitor the project outcome if and
only if the entrepreneur defaults and will then conﬁscate all the returns from the














), and the implied interest rate of loans,
R
l, can then




For such a debt contract, the expected income of an entrepreneur with project
size






























































































by the term in brackets. Similarly, the expected income of the lender on such a






















































































































8Inaddition,itmust be assumed that monitoringis a deterministicfunctionof thestate and that
a commitment device exists.









deﬁned by the term in brackets.
As in Gale and Hellwigand in Williamson, the optimal contract willmaximize
the expected pay-off to the informed entrepreneur, subject to the return of the
uninformed lender being at least its exogenous opportunity cost
R. The optimal


















































































































































which represents the units of the consumption good placed into the capital tech-
nology. Given the inﬁnite number of entrepreneurs, equation (4) can also be in-
terpreted as the new-capital supply function. Since
￿
! is independent of the level
of individual net worth
N, the linearity of (2) implies that this supply function ag-
gregates. Aggregate investment will therefore depend only on the economywide
relative price of capital
Q
=
P, the economywide identical opportunity costs
R and
on the aggregate net worth. This is an implications following from our linearity
assumptions.










N guarantees the participation of the entrepreneur. It
is also straightforwardto show that the entrepreneur will always want to invest all of his net worth
in his own project, as the expected return to internal funds is higher than the expected return to
external funds.
73 The computable general equilibrium model
In this section we will embed the static costly state veriﬁcation framework of the
previous section into a monetary business cycle model with limited participation
assumption. Among other things, this will permit us to endogenize the safe in-
terest rate and the prices of capital and consumption, all of which were taken as
given in the partial equilibrium setting.
The model economy is divided into four types of agents: consumers, ﬁrms,
entrepreneurs, and a ﬁnancial intermediary. In addition, there is a monetary au-
thority which injects new money into the system. At the beginning of time
t, the
households allocate their cash between two uses: loans to the ﬁnancial intermedi-
ary and purchases of the consumption good. By assumption nominalconsumption
must be fully ﬁnanced with cash. After this saving decisions, the monetary shock
and the aggregate technology shock are realized. Then the entrepreneurs and the
ﬁnancial intermediary will write credit contracts, which happens before both par-
ties realize the idiosyncratic productivity shock to the entrepreneurs. After the
contractual negotiations are ﬁnished, these shocks are realized and the true real-
ization is learnt costlessly by the respective entrepreneur. In the following, all
production takes place and all trade is made: the household sells his labor and
rents his capital stock to the ﬁrms and the entrepreneurs also sell their labor to the
ﬁrms. The ﬁrms produce the consumption good, the entrepreneurs buy consump-
tion goods from the ﬁrms in order to produce the capital goods. The households
also buy the consumption goods from the ﬁrms and the capital goods from the
entrepreneurs. Then the entrepreneurs will either pay back their credit or claim
to be bankrupt. In the latter case, the borrower will be monitored by the ﬁnancial
intermediary. The entrepreneurs still having resources will then decide how much
to consume and how much cash to hold and to carry over in
t
+
1 . The intermedi-
ary then pays back the deposits to the households in form of interest and principal
payments. Furthermore, the households get the proﬁts from the intermediary and
the ﬁrms and carry the balance of their income and expenditures over to the next
period as cash holding.
I now present a formal description of the model by discussing the objectives
and constraints facing the households, the ﬁrms, the entrepreneurs, and the ﬁnan-
cial intermediary.
83.1 Households
The consumers are modeled by a representative household who ranks alternative





















0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information
set,
￿ is a subjective discount rate between 0 and 1,
C




t denotes hours of work at time
t. The household is endowed with


















t of the capital good, and deposits
S
t with the




By assumption, nominal consumption must be fully ﬁnanced with cash. As all























t is the household’s cash holding at the beginning of the period.10 The
decision about the volume of deposits has to be made before observing the aggre-
gate shocks, this is the so-called “limited participation” or “sluggish cash ﬂow”
assumption.












its of the ﬁrms,
￿
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t are paid back to the household


















































































t are the time
t nominal wage rate, real rental rate
of capital, nominal price level of the consumption good, aggregate capital stock,
nominal price level of the capital goods, and investment.
10Other authors allowhouseholds to spend their current wage earnings for consumptionto min-
imize the impact of inﬂationonaverage employment inthe model. For a further discussionofthis,
see Christiano (1991).
9Formally, the representative household maximizes (5) subject to (6), (7), and






















by choosing the amount to save, the amount of consumption, the fractionof period
t time devoted to working, and the amount of investment.
3.2 Firms
The economy consists of many competitive ﬁrms producing a homogeneous con-
sumption good according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function. In
the aggregate, the ﬁrms are represented by a representative proﬁt-maximizingand


























t is the aggregate output of consumption goods,
￿
t is an aggregate pro-
ductivity shock,
K
t is the aggregate capital stock, owned by the households,
H
t is
the labor input of the households, and
H
e
t is the labor input of the entrepreneurs.
As a standard in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium business cycle model
literature, we assume that the technology shock
￿














































) is the autocorrelation coef-





Entrepreneurs are modeled as introduced in Section 2. In this section, each en-








]. The key innovation of the paper is
to allow for endogenous net worth accumulation of entrepreneurs and, hence, of
borrowers in ﬁnancial markets.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with one unit of leisure, which they inelastically
supply to the ﬁrm for the wage rate
W
e. This labor income, together with the indi-




t, determines the individual



















10Labor income is introduced so that entrepreneurs going bankrupt in one period
have at least some amount of net worth to ﬁnance projects in the next period.
Otherwise, an entrepreneur once having been insolvent, could never again ﬁnance
his project because, as shown by equation (2), the investment level
I
i is linear in
the net worth
N
i. Therefore, the fraction of active entrepreneurs of the population
would decrease over time, which would complicate the calculations considerably.




t and for net worth accumulation, which is done by cash holding carried over































































































and subject to the deﬁnition of his net worth, equation (9).
As already mentioned in Section 2, agency issues imply that the return to
internal funds exceeds the return to external funds. Given that and the inﬁnite
planning horizon of entrepreneurs in the general equilibrium setting, riskneutral
entrepreneurs would like to postpone consumption into the future and accumulate
enough net worth to be soon self-ﬁnanced so that agency costs would disappear.
In the contractual problem in Section 2 we assumed however that entrepreneur’s
net worth is never high enough for complete self-ﬁnancing. Therefore, we need
an assumption which makes cash holding less favorable for entrepreneurs. This
is done by assuming that entrepreneurs discount future consumption more heavily







).11 The exact relation between
the discount factor of the households and the entrepreneurs is determined by the
requirement that the shares of cash holing of the entrepreneurial sector and the
households is constant in the steady state.
11The same assumption was made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1998) in similar settings. An alternative way to avoid a self-ﬁnancing outcome would be to
assume that each entrepreneur has a probabilityof surviving to the next period of less than unity,
as it is done in Bernanke et al. (1999).































































Equation (12) is independent of the individual level of net worth
N
i and identical
for all solvent entrepreneurs, whatever their level individual net worth might be.
Therefore, in the analysis of the general equilibrium we have only to consider
this single Euler-equation for the whole entrepreneurial sector and do not have to




N across the entrepreneurs.
As already shown in Section 2, the aggregate investment level is also inde-
pendent of the distribution of individual net worth across the entrepreneurs and
does only depend on the aggregate amount of net worth
N
t. Therefore, for the
analysis of the aggregate economy, we do not need either any level of individual
net worth or even the distribution of net worth across entrepreneurs. In addition
to the Euler-equation (12), we just have to keep track of the aggregate level of
entrepreneurial net worth and of the entrepreneurial cash holding, being a compo-
nent of
N
































t denotes aggregate entrepreneurial consumption.
3.4 Financial Intermediary
The single ﬁnancial intermediary called “bank” is owned by the households. Its
role is to co-ordinate lending from consumers to entrepreneurs. All such lending
must be handled by the bank. It receives deposits from consumers and lump sum
payments from the government which represent the injection of money into the
system. These assets are then lent to the entrepreneurs, using the standard debt
contract outlined in Section 2. The bank behaves competitively in the deposit
market.
In contrast to the standard monetary business cycle models without agency
problems, such as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) or Cooley and Hansen
(1995), here the existence of the ﬁnancial intermediary is clearly justiﬁed. In sim-
ilar but richer credit contractual settings where direct lending from households
12to entrepreneurs as well as indirect lending via a ﬁnancial intermediary is possi-
ble, Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) show that intermediation dominates
borrowing and lending between individuals.12 The intermediary performs a “del-
egated monitoring” to avoid duplication of monitoring and to minimize aggregate
monitoring costs. In equilibrium, intermediation drives direct lending out of the
system and justiﬁes the clear and important role of the bank. Therefore, in our
model witha creditmarketwith asymmetric information,the assumption that only
indirect lending is possible is well justiﬁed.
3.5 General equilibrium
Although the core problem is nonstationary, it is possible to obtain a stationary
representation by normalizing relative to the aggregate money stock:13 The nom-
inal prices and quantities are redeﬁned by dividing them by the money supply at








































































































To completethespeciﬁcationofthe model, wespecify thefollowinglaw ofmotion

























































) is the autocorrelation coef-
ﬁcient, and the nonstochastic steady state of
￿is
￿








t, at all leads and lags.
A rational expectations equilibrium can be deﬁned in the usual way. It con-
sists of time invariantaggregate allocation and price functions of the relevant state
such that given these rules agents’ optimization satisﬁes market clearing. More
formally, the general equilibrium can be deﬁned in the following way:
Deﬁnition

































12A succinct discussionaboutthe underlyingfrictionsinmarkets that lead tointermediationcan
be found in Hellwig (1994).

















































































































are the relevant states of the economy, such that:
(i)households solve their utility maximizationproblem ofSection
3.1, taking as given the states
￿
0 and



































(ii) ﬁrms solve their proﬁt maximization problem of Section 3.2,
given














tion 3.3, taking as given the state of the economy
￿, and the pricing





































































(v) goods, money, labor and loan markets clear.











































































































































































































































































the aggregate capital stock
K






t , and the values of all






t and the period
t realizations of the
aggregate technology shock
￿
t and of the aggregate monetary shock
￿
t.







































































































































































































































In this section I will describe the quantitative properties of the model economy.
As the model is too complicated to be solved analytically, it will be solved and
analyzed numerically. In order to come up with a numerical solution to the model
the values of the parameters have to be speciﬁed. Then the solution technique can
be applied. Thereafter, the quantitative properties will be discussed using impulse
response functions.
4.1 Calibration
The model is parameterized at the non-stochastic steady state to roughly match
empirical counterparts. The period in the model is assumed to be one quarter.






















) which is based on
the work of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). The constant
v is set equal to












8 reported in Christiano
(1991). The interest rate of deposits
R





%, so that, together with the









9 taken from Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1995), the discount rate
￿ is pinned down to 0.9943 from the non-stochastic ver-
sion of equation (15). The consumption production technology is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of 0.36, a household labor share of 0.6399, and
an entrepreneurial labor share of 0.0001. We set the depreciation rate
￿ to 0.0212,
an estimate calculated by Christiano (1991). Concerning the autocorellation co-
efﬁcients of the law-of-motions of the aggregate shocks, we follow Christiano















5. The value of
￿
￿ is simply a matter of normalization, and is set to
1.
As for the monitoring technology, monitoring costs are incurred by ﬁnancial
intermediaries only when ﬁrms default on their loans. Therefore,
￿ is identiﬁed
using empirical evidence on bankruptcy costs. There is, however, a great deal
of controversy within the empirical literature about the amount of these costs. It
ranges from 1
% to 36






5, a choice roughly
in the middle which was also used by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998). As for the
distribution




We are thus left with two parameters:
￿
! and
￿. We treat this two variables
as unobservable, and choose them indirectly to match two measures of risk: the
annual risk premium and the quarterly bankruptcy rate. As quarterly bankruptcy
rate we use the value of 0.998
%, estimated using the Dun and Bradstreet data set
for 1984–1992. As annual risk premium we take the average spread between the
prime rate and the three-month commercial paper rate. As reported in Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), this average spread is 187 basis points for the period of April



















To solve the model numerically, ﬁrst the equilibrium conditions (13) – (32) are
log-linearized about the non-stochastic steady state of the economy. Then, deci-
sion rules are computed by using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients.
15Some of the relevant estimates are: Warner (1977): 1
% to 5.3
%, Altman (1984): 11 to 17
%,
Guffey and Moore (1991): 9.12
%, Alderson and Betker (1995): 36
%.
16We now turn to an analysis of the dynamic properties of the model. We in-
vestigate whether the endogenous wealth accumulation of entrepreneurs alters the
dynamic properties of a standard monetary business cycle model. This is done
by comparing the impulse responses of a monetary and a technology shock of the
model of Section 3 with the responses of two reference models. The ﬁrst one
holds the cash holding of the entrepreneurs in the agency-costs model constant at
its steady state value. Therefore, the entrepreneurs cannot change their net worth
endogenously.16 The other one is a model without agency problems: all
!
i are set





Figure 1 to 10 report the result of a one-time shock to the money growth rate. The
shock in question is assumed to appear in period 0 and to be 1









1. In the followingperiods
￿
￿ is assumed to be zero again. Although this
is a single one-time shock, because money growth is autocorrelated, the growth
rate will stay above trend for several quarters.
The dynamics of the endogenous net worth model can be described as fol-
lows. The new money enters the economy through the accounts of the bank. As
the household is unable to change and particularly reduce his deposits at this point
of time, the liquidity of the banking system raises by the full amount of the newly
created money. The increased liquidity is then lent to the entrepreneurs and there-
fore the credit volume increases. In order to make the entrepreneurs willing to
borrow the new money the interest rate on loans potentially decreases. As Fig-
ure 7 shows, this interest rate in fact decreases in the simulation. The increased
credit volume is used by the entrepreneurs to produce capital goods, so that the
end-of-period supply of capital goods increases which in turn increases aggregate
investment, as shown by Figure 2. This expanded supply of capital decreases the
relative price of capital,
q
=
p, presented in Figure 10. This induces a substitution
effect for the households: Because of capital goods being now relatively cheaper
than consumption goods, the household will shift from the latter to the former and
potentially increases its labor supply in order to ﬁnance an increased purchase of
capital goods. In the period of the shock, however, consumption spending is ﬁxed
by the cash-in-advance constraint and therefore consumption must decrease as the
16ThismodelissimilartotheoneofCooleyandNam (1998). They assume howeverthatagency
costs arise in the production of the aggregate output and not in the production of the investment
goods. They do not model an entrepreneurial sector as they assume that consumption goods are
transferred into capital goods on a constant 1:1 basis.
17consumption price level increases.
Besides this substitution effect, there is the anticipated inﬂation effect, which
is standard in monetary business cycle models, such as, e.g. the model of Cooley




0, the monetary growth continues to be high
relative to its steady state level after the one-time shock. This increases the house-
hold’s expectation of future inﬂation. The household therefore shifts from con-
sumption (the cash good) to investment (the credit good) and potentially reduces
his labor supply.
The third effect of the increased money growth rate is a labor demand effect.
Because of investment being largerthan in steady state, the aggregate capital stock
increases. This induces an increase in labor demand on the part of the ﬁrm.
The total effect is determined by the relative strength of these three effects.
The impulse responses of Figure 3 and 4 show that labor input increases and con-
sumption of households decreases for two subsequent periods. Therefore, the
substitution effect and the labor demand effect, both stating that employment in-
creases, dominate the inﬂation effect, which states that employmentdecrease. Be-
cause labor input and capital stock increases, output increases as well, as is seen
on Figure 1
We are now ready to analyze if the agency model can reproduce the stylized
facts of monetary policy. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1995), and Christiano et al. (1996) identify for the US economy the
following four important facts. An expansive money supply shock leads to a de-
crease of nominal interest rates and to an increase of employment, output and real
wages. As already mentioned in the above explanations and as shown by Figures
3, 1, and 7, respectively, employment and output level increase whereas nominal
interest rate of loans decreases in the model, so that these facts are well replicated.
Concerning the interest rate it is important to recognize that the nominal interest
rate of deposits increases, shown in Figure 6. Therefore it depends on the used
deﬁnition of nominal interest rate, of deposits or of loans, if the ﬁrst stylized fact
is really reproduced. Unfortunately, this model is unable to show the ﬁrst fact,
the increase in real wages. Here, the wages decrease following a positive money
supply shock, as shown in Figure 8.
To understand the special contributionof the endogenous wealth accumulation
of the entrepreneurs, it is important to analyze the dynamics of the two reference
models. The three basic effects in the two referencemodels are quite similar to the
effects in the model just examined. In the monetary business cycle model and in
the model with constant cash holding, as in the model with endogenous net worth
accumulation, an increase in the money growth rate leads to a substitution effect,
18an anticipated inﬂation effect, and a labor demand effect. However, the relative
strength of the effects differ between the models.
In the monetary business cycle model, because of the relative price of capital
returning quicker to its steady state value, the household’s reactions to the substi-
tution effect are weaker. As the future effects of the consumption price level are
larger the anticipated inﬂation effect will also be larger in this model. In addition,
the smaller increase in investment induces a smaller increase in labor demand. In
total, Figure 1 and 3 show for the simple monetary business cycle model that both,
output and employment decrease in period 1. We can conclude, that in this model,
the anticipated inﬂation effect is now strong enough to dominate the substitution
effect and the labor demand effect, as this is the only effect inducing a negative
employment response. Hence, in this simple model the important stylized facts
concerning output and employment cannot be reproduced. This is a standard re-
sult in monetary business cycle theory. Pure models with only a cash-in-advance
constraint and a limited participation assumption are in general incapable of gen-
erating a liquidity effect of monetary policy, see e.g. Christiano (1991). Some
kind of further inﬂexibility or imperfection is needed in order to produce positive
output and employment responses.
In the model where the cash holding of the entrepreneurs is held constant at
the steady state level, the responses are almost identical to the simple monetary
business cycle model. In total, Figure 1 and 3 show that this model can reproduce
neither the important stylized fact of an increasing output level nor the fact of an
increasing employment after a positive monetary shock.
In summary, we can state that the dynamics of the standard monetary business
cycle model and the agency model with constant entrepreneurial cash holding are
very similar, as is also seen in the plotted impulse responses. Therefore, em-
bedding agency issues in business cycle model does not have large effects on the
model dynamics. This is also emphasized in the literature.17 In contrast, the possi-
bility of entrepreneurial wealth accumulation and therefore endogenous net worth
ofborrowerschanges the dynamics ofthe model considerably. The liquidityeffect
of monetary policy is found in this model only.
Having analyzed the dynamics of all three models, we are now able to isolate
the special role of the possibility of entrepreneurialnet worth accumulationfor the
dynamics. As net worth consists mainly of previously accumulated cash holding,
it is essentially ﬁxed in the period of the shock. It just slightly decreases as, with
17See e.g. Fuerst (1995) or Cooley and Nam (1998). A similar conclusion for real models is
drawn by Fuerst (1995) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).
19an increased price level, the real value of the cash holding reduces. At the end of
the period, the entrepreneurs have the following incentive to save and therefore
to increase their net worth by holding more cash: As the relative price of capital,
q
=
p, has decreased, consumption is relatively more expansive now. Therefore, a
risk neutral entrepreneur wants to postpone consumption into the future and de-
creases present consumption. The reduction in present consumption comes along
with an increase in cash holding.18 At the beginning of period 1, net worth has
increased for several reasons. First, as just described, the nominal cash holding
of the entrepreneurs increased. Second, the wage of the entrepreneurs increases
with the increase of output. Lastly, the real value of the cash holding further
increases, as the aggregate price level decreases. This long-lasting increase in en-
trepreneurial net worthleads to a long-lasting increase in the production of capital
goods. Hence, the supply of capital will remain on a high level for a longer time.
This induces, that the relative price of capital will stay away its steady state value
for a longer period of time.
This longer lasting effects are the reasons why we see positive output and
employment responses in the model with endogenous net worth only: They in-
duce that the household reacts in a stronger way to the substitution effect, and
that the increase in labor demand is stronger. This implies that in this model the
substitution effect, together with the labor demand effect, can be strong enough
to dominate the anticipated inﬂation effect and hence lead to an increase in la-
bor input, which itself leads to an increase in aggregate output. In contrast, as
both effects are weaker in the two reference models, they are not strong enough to
dominate the anticipated inﬂation effect and hence cannot lead to an increase in
employment and output.
The next question we look at is if the model produces ampliﬁcation or stronger
propagation. In terms of output the answer to both questions is afﬁrmative, as
Figure 1 shows. The output swing of the model with endogenous entrepreneurial
cash holding is more then three times larger then in the two reference models (17
vs. 5.6
%). Concerning the second point, we measure persistence by the half-
18As seen in Figure 5, the consumption of the entrepreneurial sector decreases more in the
model with endogenous entrepreneurial cash holding than without. This shows the just described
endogenous reaction of the entrepreneurs: Only in the model with entrepreneurial cash holding,
the entrepreneurs increase their net worth by reducing their individual consumption level. There-
fore, aggregate entrepreneurial consumption now decreases not only because more entrepreneurs
go bankrupt, but also because the solvent entrepreneurs reduce their consumption spending en-
dogenously.
20life of a response, where we use the peak impact as starting point.19 Given that
deﬁnition, themodel enhances persistence. For thetworeferencemodels, the peak




%, with a half-life of less than one quarter. In the model
with endogenous net worth the peak output response is
1
7
%, with a half-life of 3
quarters.
4.2.2 Technology shock
The second experiment we consider is a one-time shock to the aggregate produc-
tivity. Figures 11 to 16 report the results of such a shock where the shock in
question is assumed to appear in period 0 and to be 1










As technology is autocorrelated, productivity will stay above trend for several
quarters.
Because the effects of real shocks in models with endogenous entrepreneurial
net worth have already been analyzed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1998), we will concentrate here on the main results. The most
important stylized fact is the so-called mean-reversion, shown by Blanchard and
Quah (1989), Cochrane (1994) and others for US data. According to this, the re-
action of outputto a transitory shock is hump-shaped: Output increases for several
quarters and reaches its peak after two to four quarters.
Inthenumericalsimulations, a shock toaggregatetechnologyleadsto astrongly
hump-shaped impulse response of output and of investment, as seen in Figures 11
and 12, respectively. Both variables increase for several quarters after the shock
has appeared and the peak is reached in period 3 and 4, respectively. In the two
reference models output and investment also increase for two subsequent periods,
the second increase is very weak. Therefore, only the model with endogenous
entrepreneurial net worth replicates this important stylized fact of a hump-shaped
output response. This is of particular interest given the recent work of Cogley and
Nason (1995). They criticize in their study that standard RBC models are unable
to deliver this hump-shaped behavior because of their weak internal propagation
mechanisms. In these models, the output reaction corresponds mainly to the dy-
namic of the technology shock. Therefore, the underlying agency cost model is
not subject to this criticism.
19Alternatively, we could use the initial impact of a response as starting point. The choice
between these two alternative is a problem especially in a model which generates a delayed re-
sponse, as this is the case in the underlying model. Here we choose the latter deﬁnition as the
initialimpacts are very weak.
21The dynamics can be interpreted in the following way: The positive technol-
ogy shock shifts outthe investment demand curve ofthe household. Subsequently,
investment demand starts moving slowly back to normal as time progresses. This
movement is largely driven by the autocorrelation coefﬁcient
￿
￿. In period 0,
as entrepreneurial net worth is determined by the accumulated cash holding, in-
vestment supply raises little so that the relative price of capital increases, seen in
Figure 14. In order to take advantage of the increased price and to increase his
income as well, an entrepreneur wishes to increase his capital good production.
This is done by decreasing present consumption and increasing cash holding, seen
in Figure 15 and 16, respectively. The investment supply function is then shifted
upwards. Therefore, the excess demand of capital goods is decreased in the fol-
lowing periods, which in turn decreases the relative price of capital as well. This
increases entrepreneurialconsumption and reduces the accumulation of additional
cash. The increase in investment leads to an increase in the capital stock. This,
together with the increased employment, leads to a hump-shaped increase in out-
put seen in Figure 11. After the peaks in period 4 and 5, output, investment,
entrepreneurial cash holding, and the relative price of capital move back to steady
state values. The hump-shaped impulse response is therefore an outcome of the
dynamic behavior of net worth in response to a technology shock.
In the two reference models, the entrepreneurs cannot react to the increased
relativeprice ofcapital, so thatthe excess demand ofinvestment is reduced slower.
Hence, investment does not increase for a longer period of time and therefore the
capital stock raises less. As there is now a monotone decrease of investment back
to its steady state value, output does not show a hump response either.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a monetary business cycle model with asymmetric informa-
tion in the credit market. This informational asymmetry creates a moral hazard
problem in lending and distorts the production of the capital good. The main
contribution of this paper is to allow endogenous wealth accumulation of en-
trepreneurs and therefore ex-ante heterogeneity of borrowers in such an infor-
mational framework.
The model economy was calibrated to roughly match empirical counterparts
and afterwards solved by the method of undermined coefﬁcients. Numerical sim-
ulations then showed that a positive money supply shock generates a decrease in
nominal interest rates and an increase in output and employment. In two refer-
22ence models this behavior was not found. Additionally, the model produces am-
pliﬁcation and stronger propagation, compared to models without endogenous net
worth accumulation. Concerning a real technology shock, we saw that the model
produces a strong hump-shaped output response in contrast to the two reference
models. We can therefore conclude, that the agency-model with ex ante hetero-
geneous entrepreneurs represents a clear improvement to the standard monetary
model as well as to the agency model with ex post heterogeneity only.
A possible extension is to abandon the assumption, that credit contracts can
depend only on an entrepreneur’scurrentlevel of net worthand noton his past his-
tory of debt repayments. This would allow for multi-period contracts which are,
unfortunately, very difﬁcult to handle in an inﬁnite general equilibrium setting.20
Another possible extension of the model would be to change the sector being
subject to agency problems. In this paper, agency costs arise in the production
of the new capital, and thus affect the investment supply curve. One alternative
is to construct a model in which agency costs arise in the consumption sector,
and thus affect the investment demand curve. Another extension could be to as-
sume that the agency costs arise in the aggregate production of a single consump-
tion/investment good and therefore build on work of Cooley and Nam (1998) or
Fisher (1999), both assuming constant net worth of borrowers.
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Figure 1: Output level









































































































Figure 3: Household labor



















































Figure 4: Household consumption






















































Figure 5: Entrepreneurial consumption




















































Figure 6: Interest rate of deposits




















































Figure 7: Interest rate of loans




















































Figure 8: Real wage of households




















































Figure 9: Cut of value
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Figure 10: Relative price of capital



















































































































































































































Figure 14: Relative price of capital





















































Figure 15: Entrepreneurial consumption

















































Figure 16: Entrepreneurial money holding
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